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Competition Law in The Shadow of State Action
Health Care Competition Law in the Shadow of State Action:
Minimizing MACs
David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic*
Abstract

How should we go about reconciling competition and consumer protection
in health care, given the long shadow cast by the state action doctrine? We
consider that issue, using a case study drawn from an obscure corner of the
pharmaceutical reimbursement market to motivate and inform our analysis.
We show how the balance between competition and consumer protection
has been distorted by the political economy of health care regulation –
compounded by the extension of the state action doctrine far past its
defensible borders. If anything, considerations of political economy argue
for much greater skepticism about the utility of regulation – and of the state
action doctrine -- in the health care space.
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Attempting to protect competition by focusing solely on
private restraints is like trying to stop the flow of water at a
fork in a stream by blocking only one of the channels.
Unless you block both channels, you are not likely to even
slow, much less stop, the flow. Eventually, all the water will
flow toward the unblocked channel. The same is true of
antitrust enforcement. If you create a system in which
private price fixing results in a jail sentence, but
accomplishing the same objective through government
regulation is always legal, you have not completely
addressed the competitive problem. You have simply
dictated the form that it will take.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

George Bernard Shaw famously observed that “all professions are
conspiracies against the laity.”2 In health care, the bill of particulars is long
and distinguished, and includes overt price-fixing; attacks on salaried
practice and pre-paid health care; and the systematic marginalization and
exclusion of competitors.3 Indeed, Professors Havighurst and King
accurately note that the entire history of medical care in the United States is
a story in which “outbreaks of . . . competition were ruthlessly suppressed. .
. .”4 Of course, these campaigns were waged in the name of “medical
science, quality of care, and professional prerogative,” rather than the naked
1

Timothy J. Muris, State Intervention/State Action – A U.S. Perspective, Remarks at
the Fordham Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy (Oct. 24, 2003),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/stateintervention/state-action-u.s.perspective/fordham031024.pdf.
2
George Bernard Shaw, The Doctors Dilemma (1909). The play was first staged in
1906.
3
See David A. Hyman, When and Why Lawyers Are the Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REV.
267 (2008). See also Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, Improving
Health
Care:
A
Dose
of
Competition
(2004),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf, published commercially as
Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition, 10 Developments in Health Economics
and Public Policy (Springer, 2005); Federal Trade Commission, Overview of FTC
Antitrust Actions in Health Care Services and Products, Mar. 2013, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/competition-policyguidance/hcupdate.pdf
4
Clark C. Havighurst & Nancy M. P. King, Private Credentialing of Health Care
Personnel: An Antitrust Perspective—Part Two, 9 AM. J. L. & MED. 263, 291 (1983).
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self-interest of the medical profession.5 But, regardless of the external
branding, the effect was the same: the medical profession was able to set the
terms of trade, and exclude or substantially limit the authorized scope of
practice for new entrants.6 Emboldened by these successes, other health
care providers used similar tactics to protect their turf and set the terms of
trade.
In health care, private individuals and entities were the first movers, but
those involved quickly recognized the value of enlisting the government in
their conspiracies against the laity. Compared to privately-imposed
restraints on trade, governmental restraints “are more effective and efficient,
and include a built-in cartel enforcement mechanism.”7 And, as we detail
below, governmentally imposed restraints are much harder to attack than
private restraints.
The consequences of these dynamics were quite predictable. Over time,
the health care marketplace became enmeshed in a complex web of interlocking public and private restraints of trade. Not coincidentally, health
care spending, and the rate of spending growth spiraled upward.
For these and other reasons, health care became a target-rich
environment for antitrust enforcers beginning in the early 1970s.8 Indeed,
several generations of enforcement personnel at the Federal Trade
Commission cut their teeth on merger reviews and cases involving every
conceivable participant in the health care sector, including hospitals,
doctors, pharmaceutical companies, and pharmacy benefit managers
(“PBMs.”)9 As we noted in a recent article:

5

Id.
Id (concluding the medical profession “was able to repel most attacks along its
borders, to force many of its antagonists into alliances, and to confine other would-be
invaders to narrow enclaves.”)
7
David A. Hyman & Shirley Svorny, If Professions are Just “Cartels By Another
Name,” What Should We Do About It? 163 U. PENN. L. REV. ONLINE, available at
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review_online/vol163/iss1/7.
8
We explore the FTC’s decision to focus on health care markets in William E.
Kovacic
&
David
A.
Hyman,
Consume
or
Invest:
What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize?, 91 WASH L. REV. 295 (2016).
9
See e.g., FTC-DOJ, supra note 3; See also FTC, supra note 3; William Blumenthal, A
Primer on the Application of Antitrust Law to the Professions in the United States, Sep. 29,
2006,
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/primer-applicationantitrust-law-professions-united-states/20060929cbablumenthalmaterials_0.pdf; John E.
Kwoka, Jr., The Federal Trade Commission and the Professions: A Quarter Century of
Accomplishment and Some New Challenges, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 997 (2005).
6
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Since the 1970s, the FTC has devoted considerable effort to
health care, beginning with a major case challenging
restrictions on advertising in the medical profession, and
then going on from there to bring cases involving every
aspect of the health care delivery system. In health care, the
FTC has batted through its entire rotation of policy tools,
including numerous cases, rulemaking, advisory opinions,
hearings, and competition advocacy. More than any other
program, the health care program has paid the rent for the
FTC’s charter as a competition authority.10
The Department of Justice Antitrust Division and state Attorneys General
have also been active in this space, albeit on a less continuous basis than the
FTC.
The campaign against anti-competitive practices within the health care
sector has had its ups and downs, but it is clear that it has had an impact on
the frequency and severity of privately imposed anti-competitive
restraints.11 The picture for publicly imposed restraints is considerably
murkier, because such restraints are effectively insulated from substantive
antitrust scrutiny, as long as they qualify as state action – no matter how
overtly anti-competitive they are, and no matter how flimsy their supposed
justification. And, in health care, there is no shortage of overtly anticompetitive restraints, imposed on the basis of flimsy or non-existent
evidence, at the behest of politically connected special interests.
These dynamics complicate the already complex process of reconciling
competition and consumer protection in health care – since much of what is
styled as consumer protection is, in fact, provider protection. The same
dynamics also argue in favor of re-examining the appropriate boundaries of
the state action doctrine.
We examine these issues using a case study drawn from an obscure
corner of the pharmaceutical reimbursement market -- maximum allowable
cost (“MAC”) schedules. Medicaid and PBMs use MACs to reimburse
pharmacies for dispensing generic drugs. MACs were pioneered by state
Medicaid programs, and then adopted by PBMs. But, in the past few years,
MACs have become the focal point of heated controversies between PBMs
10

Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 7.
Plus, in yet another example of demand creating supply, there is now a thriving
health care antitrust private bar, along with the requisite ABA section, AHLA practice
group, and numerous opportunities to obtain CLE credits for attending health care antitrust
conferences in glamorous locales.
11
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and pharmacies – triggering legislative action in 38 states (including Puerto
Rico). Although the dispute is invariably cast in terms of consumer
protection (framed in terms of patients’ ability to access to pharmacy
services), our case study makes it clear that the issue is really about
protecting the providers of pharmacy services from the disruptive forces of
competition.
Part II lays out some of the complexities of reconciling competition and
consumer protection in health care. Part III reviews the basics of the state
action doctrine. Part IV presents our case study of MACs. Part V sketches
out some suggestions on how to improve matters – both for MACs, and for
the larger set of issues for which MACs are a stand-in. Part VI concludes.
II.

RECONCILING COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN
HEALTH CARE

How should we think about reconciling competition and consumer
protection in health care? The preconditions for perfectly competitive
markets (including no barriers to entry or exit; fungible goods; and perfect
information) are obviously not applicable to health care. And, in health
care, we combine high stakes, profound asymmetries of information, and
deep moral opposition to acknowledging the existence of resource
constraints.
Because of the felt necessities created by these dynamics, health care is
a field dominated by regulation. The laundry list of regulations includes
strict restrictions on entry (i.e., licensure, accreditation, certificates of
need/public necessity, and restrictions on scope of practice); specification of
minimum terms of trade (mandated benefits, any willing providers, voiding
of liability waivers); and aggressive ex post enforcement (hospital
privileges proceedings; state disciplinary action, and medical malpractice
litigation). Each and every one of these regulatory initiatives is sold on the
basis that they are absolutely necessary consumer protections – and the
alternative is an unregulated market, that would operate “as a savage war of
all against all, red in tooth and claw, populated solely by charlatans and
snake oil vendors.”12
Most of the health law professoriate is perfectly fine with this extensive
list of anti-competitive restraints. Indeed, if anything, the health law
professoriate has devoted most of its time to identifying and cataloging new
ways in which health care markets can be further tamed or supplanted
entirely with regulations. (In fairness, that attitude and approach is
12

Hyman & Svorny, supra note 7.
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inextricably linked to the general political commitments of the law
professoriate, and is not unique to professors that focus on health law). But,
for the sake of argument, let’s assume that there is a constituency that might
be open to arguments in favor of striking an actual balance between
competition and consumer protection, rather than simply assuming that
anything and everything that emerges from the legislative and regulatory
process is a-ok. What would that argument look like?
The argument would begin by noting that markets have developed
plenty of strategies for signaling and evaluating quality in health care.13 It
would also observe that competition is itself a powerful tool for protecting
consumers; legislators are poorly informed under the best of circumstances
(and health policy is never made under the best of circumstances); and that
legislators and regulators don’t have anywhere near the right incentives to
arrive at optimal policy solutions.14 That said, the most entertaining
argument for skepticism about the merits and distributional consequences of
legislative/regulatory intervention was cuttingly stated by P.J. O’Rourke:
When government does, occasionally, work, it works in an
elitist fashion.
That is, government is most easily
manipulated by people who have money and power already.
This is why government benefits usually go to people who
don't need benefits from government. Government may
make some environmental improvements, but these will be
improvements for rich bird-watchers. And no one in
government will remember that when poor people go birdwatching they do it at Kentucky Fried Chicken.15
Stated differently, in the health care space, governmental action “generally
favors the concentrated interests of incumbent providers and hurts, rather
than helps, consumers.”16 Given the unsavory alliance of Bootleggers and
Baptists that are seemingly required to trigger regulatory action in the health
care space, any protection of consumers is likely to be incidental/accidental
at best.17 Accordingly, absent proof to the contrary, we should not pretend
13

Id.
Id.
15
P.J. O’ROURKE, ALL THE TROUBLE IN THE WORLD: THE LIGHTER SIDE OF FAMINE,
PESTILENCE, DESTRUCTION AND DEATH 199 (1994).
16
See David A. Hyman, Getting the Haves to Come out Behind: Fixing the
Distributive Injustices of American Health Care, 69 L. Contemp. Probs. 265 (2006). See
also David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong With A Patient Bill of
Rights, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 221(2000).
17
Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, 22 REGULATION 3 (1999),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv22n3/bootleggers.pdf (“[D]urable
14
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or assume that health care legislation or regulation actually does much of
anything to protect consumers – or was ever intended to do so.18
With that unpleasant framing clearly established, we now turn to the
state action doctrine, which significantly limits the ability of antitrust
enforcers to attack publicly-imposed restraints on competition.
III.

THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

Federalism requires that we decide whether, when, and how states can
deviate from the dictates of federal law. In antitrust, the Supreme Court has
developed and applied the state action doctrine, which gives states broad
discretion to override the commands of federal law.19 States may enact
legislation that contradicts the federal antitrust laws and immunizes private
actors from antitrust challenge, so long as the state satisfies two
conditions.20 The state must clearly articulate its purpose to suppress
rivalry.21 And the state must actively supervise implementation of the
anticompetitive regime.22
These requirements have tripped up some of the more clumsy attempts
to use the power of the state to restrict competition.23 But, for those who
are able to follow (fairly simple) directions, the path to a governmentenforced cartel is well marked – and health care providers have taken full
advantage of the invitation to clothe their anti-competitive behavior in the
protective garb of state action doctrine. Worse still, courts have shown
themselves quite willing to accept even far-fetched invocations of the state
action doctrine – although there has been a welcome trend toward a more
social regulation evolves when it is demanded by both of two distinctly different groups.
‘Baptists point to the moral high ground and give vital and vocal endorsement of laudable
public benefits promised by a desired regulation . . . . ‘Bootleggers’ who expect to profit
from the very regulatory restrictions desired by Baptists, grease the political machinery
with some of the expected proceeds.”).
18
Hyman, Getting the Haves, supra note 16, at 279 (“to date, provider capture of state
and federal legislators and regulators is the rule, and the results have not been pretty.
Indeed, the status quo. . . is the direct result of regulatory and legislative oversight, with its
known susceptibility to symbolic blackmail, “motherhood and apple pie” initiatives, and
other forms of government failure.”)
19
The doctrine originated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), which rejected a
claim that a state-approved scheme to prorate raisin production in California violated the
Sherman Act’s ban on monopolization and conspiracies to monopolize.
20
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 99
(1980).
21
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1003 (2013).
22
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101 (2015).
23
In
re
South
Carolina
State
Board
of
Dentistry,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/0210128/south-carolina-state-boarddentistry-matter .
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restrictive application of the doctrine in recent years.24
We now turn to our case study, drawn from the depths of the
pharmaceutical market.
IV.

PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS AND MACS

Pharmaceuticals come in two varieties: branded and generic. Branded
drugs capture most of the media attention, and are responsible for a heavily
disproportionate share of drug spending -- but generic prescriptions account
for more than 85% of filled prescriptions.25 Generic drugs are significantly
cheaper than branded drugs – but in recent years, generic drug prices have
trended upward – sometimes sharply.26 Like any other product, generic
drug pricing is affected by both supply-side and demand-side factors.27
How much should pharmacies be paid for dispensing pharmaceuticals –
and on what basis? That problem has vexed insurers, PBMs, state Medicaid
programs, and health policy experts for decades. In most markets, list
prices provide a reasonable starting point (if not the actual benchmark) for
gauging the amount that must be paid to acquire a product. But, as we
detail below, matters in pharmaceutical markets are considerably more
complex – in part because of the product life cycle of generic drugs, and in
part because of competition within the pharmaceutical supply chain. As
such, using list prices virtually ensures that pharmacies will be overpaid –
sometimes substantially so – for dispensing drugs. Considerable evidence
indicates that payers have been overpaying for prescription drugs (both
branded and generic) for decades. We focus in this article on generic drugs.
We begin with a brief description of the life-cycle of generic drugs, and of
the nature of competition within the pharmaceutical supply chain.
A. Pricing and the Life Cycle of Generic Drugs
A generic pharmaceutical’s life cycle typically starts with a 180-day
period of marketing exclusivity, which is granted to the first generic
24

Compare FTC, Report of the FTC State Action Task Force, Sep. 2003, at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/report-state-actiontask-force/stateactionreport.pdf with Phoebe Putney, supra note 21.
25
Aria A. Razmaria, Generic Drugs, 315 JAMA 2746 (2016).
26
Dennis Thompson, U.S. Prices Soaring for Some Generic Drugs, Experts Say, U.S.
News, Nov. 12, 2014; Victoria Colliver, Prices Soar For Some Generic Drugs, San
Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 1, 2014, at http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Prices-soar-forsome-generic-drugs-5105538.php.
27
Of late, there has been a significant run-up in the cost of some generic drugs. See
Jonathan D. Alpern, William M. Stauffer, and Aaron S. Kesselheim, High-Cost Generic
Drugs — Implications for Patients and Policymakers, 371 New Engl. J. Med. 1859 (2014)
(“Numerous factors may cause price increases for non–patent-protected drugs, including
drug shortages, supply disruptions, and consolidations within the generic-drug industry.”)
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approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).28 During this 180day period, the first-approved generic competes only with the brand name
version of the product and any “authorized generics” that the brand
manufacturer either makes itself or allows on the market through licensing
agreements.
If only one generic is available during the 180-day period, pharmacies
can typically acquire the drug for about 20% less than the brand price.29 If
“authorized generics” are also available, the competition is greater -- so the
pharmacy’s acquisition cost may be 30% less than the brand price.30 Drug
wholesalers also seek to negotiate discounts – which can be as high as 4050% when an authorized generic is available.31 In a competitive market,
these discounts will be passed on to pharmacies. However, the list price
does not typically reflect the impact of these discounts, or it significantly
lags the impact of these discounts.
Once the 180-day exclusivity period ends, the market is open to any
generic approved by the FDA, and dramatic savings can result if many
generics enter the market, as will happen for highly prescribed
medications.32 Again, the list price typically does not reflect the impact of
these price drops, or it significantly lags the impacts of these price declines.
After 1-2 years, the market for a particular generic drug typically
matures. Some manufacturers may exit due to low margins or an eroding
market for the drug, or as newer medications in the same class also become
available in generic form.33 Mergers can also reduce the number of
manufacturers producing a particular drug. As the number of drug
manufacturers declines, prices may increase. Prices may also increase in
the event of shortages, whether due to manufacturing problems or
interruptions in the supply of an active ingredient. Other generic drug
manufacturers cannot respond to price increases by entering the market,
unless they have FDA approval – and it can be time-consuming to obtain
that approval. Once again, the list price generally does not reflect the
28

To secure this marketing exclusivity, the generic drug company must also file what
is known as a “paragraph IV certification.” This document indicates that the generic drug
company believes any applicable patents are either invalid or will not be infringed.
29
Fein, A.J., 2014-15 Economic Report on Retail, Mail, and Specialty Pharmacies,
Drug Channels Institute, January 2015, at 129.
30
Id at 129-130.
31
Id. at 130.
32
For example, after the 180-day exclusivity period ended for the first generic version
of the Lexapro (a popular anti-depressant), eleven additional generics were approved by the
FDA. The additional competition drove the price per 10 mg pill down from $2.63 to $0.16
within a month -- a 94% decrease. Id. at 130-131.
33
Id. at 131.
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impact of this pricing volatility, or it significantly lags the impact of these
price changes.
B. Pricing and Supply Chain Competition
Wholesalers routinely offer discounts to pharmacies. The most
common discount is for prompt payment – but wholesalers may also
provide discounts to pharmacies that purchase a minimum quantity of
generic drugs. Alternatively, wholesalers can provide discounts on brand
name drugs as long as the pharmacy purchases a minimum volume of
generic drugs. Drug wholesalers offer these incentives because they earn a
disproportionate share of their profits from generics; in 2014, generics
generated 16% of their revenue but 75% of their profits.34
To enhance their negotiating leverage, independent pharmacies often
join together in buying groups (“PSAOs”) to concentrate their purchases
with one or more preferred vendors. In exchange for the PSAO selecting a
wholesaler as its preferred vendor, the wholesaler may agree to provide
discounts on the group’s consolidated purchases. Some of these discounts
may be paid as a quarterly rebate based on the aggregate volume of generics
purchased by the group.35 None of these discounts and rebates are typically
reflected in the list prices for generics – and they also may not be reflected
in the invoice associated with the drug purchase.
C. The Origins of MAC
When Medicaid was launched, it sought to pay providers their actual
and justifiable costs – and not one penny more. MACs emerged in the
Medicaid program as a tool to do just that – i.e., to set pharmaceutical
spending at the minimum amount necessary to obtain the drug in question.
State and federal regulations govern the amount that Medicaid can
reimburse for prescription drugs.
Before MACs were developed,
reimbursement generally involved paying the lesser of the estimated
acquisition cost (EAC) plus a reasonable dispensing fee, or the providers’
usual and customary charges to the general public. The EAC was typically
determined based on published list prices – including the Average
Wholesale Price (“AWP”).
At one time, the AWP reflected pharmacy’s acquisition costs, but, it
quickly became apparent that there was considerable divergence between
the AWP and pharmacists’ true acquisition cost, particularly when generic
drugs became more prevalent. Once this became clear, it was necessary to
modify Medicaid’s reimbursement formula, to ensure the amounts paid
34
35

Id. at 113.
Id. at 112.
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reflected pharmacists’ actual costs (i.e., the acquisition cost plus the costs
associated with dispensing the pharmaceutical).
In 1987, the federal government responded by requiring states to
implement an aggregate payment limit for specific drugs.36 The payment
limit (known as a “FUL,” for “Federal Upper Limit”) was determined
mechanically.37 Pursuant to this payment limit, the dispensing pharmacy
was paid a flat amount for acquiring the dispensed drug, irrespective of its
actual acquisition cost. However, some state Medicaid program directors
believed they were still overpaying for many drugs. Those states responded
by adopting MAC programs, which were similar to FULs, but applied to a
far broader array of drugs, and set lower reimbursement levels.38 Medicaid
MACs are calculated based on aggregate figures that reflect pharmacies’
average acquisition cost for a given pharmaceutical product. As of January
12, 2012, all states used FULs and approximately 45 states used MACs in
their Medicaid programs.39
D. Private-Sector Use of MACs
PBMs use contracts to create pharmacy networks. Approximately 95%
of the nation’s retail pharmacies are included in one or more PBM
pharmacy networks. A pharmacy that joins a network agrees to accept the
terms in their contract (often called a participating pharmacy agreement
(“PPA”). The PPA specifies how pharmacies will be reimbursed, details the
nature of any MACs that may apply, and spells out the process for resolving
disputes. Pharmacies are free to decline to contract with an insurer/PBM
for whatever reason they choose – including inadequate reimbursement,
uncertainty about the level of reimbursement, or the “hassle factor” of
dealing with a particular insurer/PBM.
In designing and implementing a PPA, the PBM must balance two
competing goals: it wants to ensure a broad network of pharmacies at which
prescriptions may be filled (since ease of access to covered services is one
of the “products” the PBM is selling to payers), but it also has to control the
36

42 C.F.R. sec. 447.301 et seq.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”) modified the formula
for calculating a payment limit. The federal government is still in the process of
implementing this change. For an estimate of the impact of these changes, see Office of
Inspector General, Analyzing Changes to Medicaid Federal Upper Limit Amounts (Oct.
2012), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-11-00650.pdf.
38
Richard G. Abramason et al, Generic Drug Cost Containment in Medicaid: Lessons
from Five State MAC Programs, 25 Health Care Financing Review 25 (2004).
39
Office of Inspector General, Medicaid Drug Pricing in State Maximum Allowable
Cost Programs (August 29, 2013), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-1100640.asp.
37
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cost of the covered services (since low cost is also one of the “products” the
PBM is selling). If a PBM errs in one direction (i.e., through overly
generous payments for pharmaceuticals), it will ensure a broad network of
pharmacies, but the covered services will be less affordable – meaning the
PBM may not get the business for which it is bidding. Conversely, if the
PBM errs in the other direction (i.e., through inadequate payment for
pharmaceuticals, excessive hassle factor or DIR fees, and the like),
pharmacies will decline to contract; will drop out of the PBMs’ network; or
will refuse to stock pharmaceuticals for which the MAC payment is
insufficient. Employers and employees will not value a pharmacy network
that is too limited along any of these dimensions – meaning the PBM may
not get the business for which it is bidding.
When properly designed, MACs help PBMs steer a middle-ground
between these two extremes. By paying the average acquisition costs
incurred by a well-run pharmacy, MACs create the necessary incentive for
pharmacies to purchase and dispense the lowest-priced generics that are
available in the market. Of course, periodic adjustments are necessary to
deal with unanticipated or extraordinary circumstances, but market forces
serve to discipline over-reaching by all involved parties (i.e., pharmacies,
PBMs, and employers/employee benefit plans).
E. The Effect of MACs: A Dose of Theory
What are the effects of including a MAC in a PPA? MACs have had at
least five distinct effects. First, MACs encourage pharmacies to dispense
the generic version of applicable pharmaceuticals. Second, MACs heighten
competition among generic manufacturers. Third, MACs help ensure that
pharmacies are not being overpaid for the services they provide. Fourth,
MACs lower spending on pharmaceutical benefits, thereby reducing the
cost of prescription drug coverage. Finally, MACs make prescription drug
reimbursement more efficient.
1. Incentivizing Pharmacies to Dispense Generics
When pharmacies are only paid the amount specified in the MAC, they
have a substantially increased incentive to acquire and dispense generic
drugs.40 This dynamic means that a MAC will increase the share of generic
drugs that are dispensed, compared to a pure cost-based reimbursement
system. In the absence of a MAC, the pharmacy’s incentives are quite
different, since it will be paid based on a list price that often bears little
40

Id. at 5 (“Because pharmacy reimbursement is based on a single MAC price
(regardless of whether a generic or brand version of a drug is dispensed), the program
creates a financial incentive to substitute lower-cost generic equivalents for their brandname counterparts.”)
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resemblance to the actual acquisition cost. Under those circumstances (i.e.,
absent a MAC), a pharmacy that dispenses a higher-priced drug (i.e., the
brand name version) will actually be paid more – increasing the cost of
providing prescription drug benefits, without providing any commensurate
benefits.
2. Increasing Competition Among Generic Manufacturers
When pharmacies only receive the amount specified in the MAC, they
have an increased incentive to “shop for the best deal,” and find generic
drugs at the lowest possible price (since they get to keep the difference
between the acquisition price and the MAC). This heightens price
competition among generic drug manufacturers and drug wholesalers, who
know that offering lower-priced generics will help drive more sales.
Absent a MAC, pharmacies have much less incentive to buy the lowestcost generic, since their reimbursement is based on the list price (which, as
noted above, often bears little relationship to the acquisition cost). Under
those circumstances, pharmacies will predictably seek to maximize the
difference between the list price and their actual cost, rather than simply
buying the lowest-cost generic.
3. Ensuring Pharmacies Are Not Overpaid
Cost-based reimbursement can lead to various forms of gaming that
result in excess payments to pharmacies. For example, pharmacies have an
incentive to dispense higher-priced drugs, particularly if they are paid a
percentage mark-up on their incurred costs. MACs help prevent this
behavior, and ensure that the requisite services are obtained at a level
consistent with actual costs.
4. Lowering Prescription Drug Spending – and the Cost of
Prescription Drug Coverage
When we combine the first three effects with the lower price at which
generics are dispensed, it becomes clear that MACs help lower prescription
drug spending – which in turn reduces the cost of prescription drug
coverage. In an analysis of Medicaid MACs, the HHS Office of Inspector
General (“OIG”) concluded that MACS had “significant value” in
“containing Medicaid drug costs.”41 The OIG also noted that if all states
adopted the strictest MAC program then in use in 2011, generic drug
spending would decline by more than 20% in fourteen states, and total

41

Id. at 21 (“Our findings demonstrate the significant value MAC programs have in
containing Medicaid drug costs.”)
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Medicaid pharmaceutical spending would have been $966 million lower.42
5. Enhanced Market Efficiency
Each drug manufacturer has its own unique list price for every dosage
and variation of each drug that they sell. As discussed previously, these list
prices vary widely, and bear little relationship to pharmacies’ actual
acquisition cost. A MAC cuts through the forest of individual list prices,
and specifies the reimbursement that will be paid, regardless of the list price
and the actual acquisition cost. Payers need not inquire into the specifics of
individual transactions, and instead simply pay the standardized amount.
By eliminating the need to conduct individualized assessments, MACs help
lower transaction costs and structure the market more efficiently, thereby
improving system performance.
F. Legislative Efforts
In the last three years, thirty-eight states have adopted MAC-related
legislation.43 We provide a list of these states and the associated statutes in
the appendix. Inter alia, these statutes require public disclosure of each
PBMs’ MACs and the methodology for arriving at the amounts that will be
paid; limit the circumstances in which MACs may be used (i.e., by
requiring a certain number of A-rated equivalents); require the submission
of proprietary information regarding MACs to public authorities; specify
particular methods and time-frames for MAC appeals and payment
adjustments, including requiring retroactive payments; and in a few
instances require PBMs to reimburse the actual acquisition costs that are
incurred, even if a cheaper alternative was available in the marketplace.
G. Likely Effects of MAC Legislation
From a competition law perspective, none of these initiatives are likely
to improve the performance of the pharmaceutical market, and most seem
quite likely to make things worse. First, restrictive state-specific criteria
undermine the flexibility of PBMs to develop and implement MACs.
Mandatory public disclosure of MACs and the specifics of the underlying
methodologies are unlikely to benefit consumers, since both will probably
lead to less intensive competition and higher prices.44 Requiring specific
42

Id. Wyoming’s MAC program resulted in the greatest aggregate savings.
In addition, federal legislation was proposed, but was not enacted. S. 867, 113th
Cong. (2013-2014), at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/867.
44
In pharmaceutical markets, the intensity of competition is a function of various
factors, including the ability of PBMs to obtain a competitive advantage by developing
more effective MACs. Forced disclosure of MAC methodologies may undermine PBMs’
incentive to invest in such efforts (since other PBMs will be able to free-ride). In that
environment, PBMs will be less likely to innovate – meaning that MACs will be less
effective than they could be. Stated differently, compelled disclosure can create a risk to
43
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methods and timeframes for MAC appeals and payment adjustments—
including requiring “retroactive” payments—is also likely to have
unintended effects. Such provisions seem likely to result in administrative
complexity and unpredictability, which will in turn result in increased costs.
The provisions which require PBMs to pay at least actual acquisition
costs are particularly pernicious. The inflationary consequences of costbased reimbursement are well known, and help explain why such
reimbursement schemes have fallen into disfavor in health care.45 The same
dynamic has played out in the context of government procurement.46 The
competition, which is likely to result in higher prices for consumers.
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has studied these issues, and issued three
detailed advocacy letters in 2004, 2006, and 2011 on the impact of mandated disclosure of
PBM contract terms. See Letter from FTC staff to Rep. Mark Formby (March 22, 2011),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/policy/policy-actions/advocacy-filings/2011/03/ftc-staffletter-honorable-mark-formby-mississippi; Letter from FTC staff to Rep. Terry G. Kilgore
(October 2, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/V060018.pdf; Letter from FTC staff
to Rep. Greg Aghazarian (Sept. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/V040027.pdf.
The FTC and Department of Justice also issued a lengthy joint report on health care
and competition policy in 2004 that discussed these issues, and a report in 2005 that
provided extensive information on PBM operations. See Improving Health Care, supra
note 3; Federal Trade Commission, Pharmacy Benefit Managers: Ownership of MailOrder
Pharmacies
(Aug.
2005),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf. To be sure, the
FTC was studying a different set of issues, but the risks to competition of compelled
transparency are analogous. One of us (Hyman) was a co-author of the 2004 advocacy
letter, and both of us worked on the FTC-DOJ report.
45
Prior to 1983, Medicare relied on cost-based reimbursement for inpatient
hospitalization. Medicare payments were accordingly based on whatever costs the hospital
incurred – and each hospital had virtually complete freedom to determine its own cost
structure. The result was entirely predictable: Medicare costs for inpatient treatment
skyrocketed, as hospitals determined that there were no effective constraints on the
amounts they could bill, as long as they had legitimately incurred the associated costs.
After the consequences of cost-based reimbursement became clear, a bipartisan
consensus in favor of a different payment system emerged. In 1983, Medicare switched to
a prospective payment system (“PPS”), which paid a standardized amount, irrespective of
the actual costs incurred by the hospital. A small number of hospitals were excluded from
the PPS. However, payment for the overwhelming majority of hospitals switched virtually
overnight from cost-based reimbursement to the PPS.
Hospitals suddenly had an incentive to pay attention to the costs they incurred for
treating each patient, instead of simply passing those costs on. Although there have been
issues with the implementation of PPS, there has been no serious discussion of a return to
cost-based reimbursement for hospitals.
46
For many years, the federal government used cost-based procurement for defense
contracts. Unfortunately, this approach created little incentive for defense contractors to
perform in the most efficient way possible, since they knew their costs would be
reimbursed, however much they were. Cost-based reimbursement also meant that the
government assumed most of the risks of performance, because it had agreed to pay the

Minimizing MACs

17

problems with cost-based contracts were well known to defense contractors
and to Congress.47 Federal procurement regulations now specify that costbased reimbursement contracts may only be used when the contracting
officer certifies that a fixed-price type contract can’t be used.48
To sum up, restrictions on the use of MACs that push pharmaceutical
purchasing toward cost-based reimbursement will lead to increases in
pharmaceutical spending and increases in the cost of prescription drug
coverage. The magnitude of these increases are obviously subject to
considerable uncertainty,49 but the directional effect seems clear.

contractor its full allowable incurred costs until the job was accomplished, or the contract
was terminated. Unsurprisingly, cost-based contracts sometimes resulted in sizeable cost
over-runs (relative to the originally estimated and budgeted cost) for defense procurement.
47
A book by then-Representative Henry Waxman concisely summarizes the prevailing
wisdom on the perils of cost-based reimbursement:
One Halliburton official told us that the company’s mantra was “Don’t
worry about price. It’s a cost-plus.” One needn’t be a math wiz to
understand how quickly this system inflates costs and even gives
contractors an incentive to run up enormous bills.
HENRY WAXMAN, THE WAXMAN REPORT: HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS (2009).
48
FAR.
16.301-2,
available
at
https://www.acquisition.gov/sites/default/files/current/far/html/Subpart%2016_3.html.
More specifically, the contracting officer must certify that the circumstances do not allow
the agency to define its requirements sufficiently to allow for a fixed-price type contract;
or the uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated
with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract. And, when a cost-based
contract is used, the contracting officer is required to employ appropriate surveillance
measures, to provide assurance that efficient methods and effective cost controls are in
place. FAR 16-301-3(a).
49
We have located two attempts to “score” the impact of state-level regulation of
MACs.
One study, done by Visante, estimated that spending on the affected
pharmaceuticals would increase by 31-56%, with a nationwide impact of $6.2 billion
increased spending annually. Visante, Proposed MAC Legislation May Increase Costs Of
Affected Generic Drugs By More Than 50 Percent, January, 2015, on file with author.
Importantly, this estimate captures only the immediate fiscal impact, and not the more
long-term indirect consequences.
The second study was performed by the Washington Health Care Authority (“WHCA),
and involved “scoring” the financial impact of proposed legislation that prohibited PBMs
from paying pharmacies less than their actual acquisition cost. WHCA concluded the
proposed legislation would make MAC lists much less effective, and would dramatically
reduce pharmacies’ incentive to acquire generic drugs at the lowest possible cost. WHCA
Fiscal Note, SSB – 5857. Although WHCA did not settle on a single number for the fiscal
impact of SB 5857, it presented a range of figures, up to and including a 10% increase in
the cost of pharmaceuticals. WHCA specifically determined that the legislation would
“significantly increase” costs for public employee benefits and would also have a costincreasing impact on Medicaid.
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H. How The Empire Struck Back: The Political Economy of MAC
Legislation
How did such overtly anti-competitive legislation get enacted in such
short order, by so many states? One of the most important insights to
understanding U.S. health policy is that every dollar of health care spending
is a dollar of income for some health care provider.50 To the extent MACs
are effective at reducing pharmaceutical spending on generic drugs, they
reduce the amounts that pharmacies receive for dispensing those same
drugs. Not surprisingly, pharmacists feel aggrieved that their services are
not being compensated at the handsome level that they believe their
expertise and professionalism justifies – and they lobby for relief from the
hardships imposed by competitive markets.
Pharmacists began these lobbying campaigns with at least three distinct
advantages. First, like funeral directors and car dealerships, there are one or
more pharmacies in every legislative district – many of which are small
independent pharmacies. These small independent pharmacies are pillars of
the local business community. Second, if a legislator has to pick sides, the
small independent local pharmacy is a much more appealing entity than a
large out-of-state PBM. Third, many legislators believe there is a serious
problem with access to pharmacy care in rural areas, where most
pharmacies are small and independent.
Although chains account for a near-majority of pharmacies in most
states, the protection of small independent local pharmacies from the
depredations of large out-of-state PBMs was the basis of the lobbying
campaign. The flames were fanned by references to the rebates that PBMs
were receiving from drug companies.51 Given these dynamics, it is not
surprising that we went from no states with MAC legislation at the
beginning of 2013 to thirty-eight states having such legislation only three
and a half years later.
Three features of the MAC statutes listed in the Appendix deserve
further attention. First, although the legislative campaign was built around
the protection of independent (mostly rural) pharmacies, state MAC statutes
were not so limited. Instead, in all of these jurisdictions, every single
50

Hyman, supra note 16, at 280 (noting “the reality that every dollar of health care
spending by someone is a dollar of income for someone else.”)
51
These rebates are paid on branded drugs – not generics – so it is difficult to see the
relevance of this argument to a dispute over whether PBMs are paying pharmacies the right
amount for dispensing generic drugs. And, the fact that PBMs may have multiple sources
of revenue does not translate into an obligation to share any of that revenue with
pharmacies, unless doing so is necessary to induce the pharmacies to participate in the
PBM’s network.
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pharmacy – including chain drugstores in urban locations – receives the
benefits of the legislation. That strategy means the legislation is not well
targeted to address the supposed problem that it is allegedly remedying.
Stated differently, MAC legislation puts money in the pockets of all
pharmacies in a state – whether they “need” it or not. (Need is in quotes
because the issue is simultaneously an empirical question, and also a matter
of opinion). That is an exceedingly peculiar understanding of consumer
protection – to say the least.
Second, in thirty-six of the thirty-eight states, the state Medicaid
program is excluded from the requirements imposed by the MAC
legislation.52 Many of these states also exclude state employees from the
“consumer protections” contained in the MAC statutes. The only thing
these two groups have in common is that the costs of their health coverage
are on-budget expenses, borne (either in whole or in part) by the state in its
sovereign capacity. By excluding these populations from the scope of
MAC legislation, state legislators made it clear that they thought that the
supposed consumer protections were worth doing -- right up until the
moment the state would bear the costs of doing so. This pattern is certainly
not unique to MAC legislation – but it provides a useful (albeit underinclusive) signal of legislation that is provider protection masquerading as
consumer protection.53
Finally, in some states, the legislative history casts light on whose
interests are actually being protected. When Iowa was considering MAC
legislation, one overly enthusiastic legislator stated that the legislation was
necessary because the lack of regulation was “eroding local pharmacies.”
Another Iowa legislator explained that legislation was necessary because
PBMs were engaging in “unfair business practices that hurt community
pharmacies and their patients.” Similarly, when Washington enacted MAC
legislation, the Office of Insurance Commissioner was instructed to conduct
a study that would inter alia “discuss suggestions that recognize the unique
nature of small and rural pharmacies and possible options that support a
viable business model that do not increase the cost of pharmacy products.”54
As these examples indicate, MAC legislation is provider protection – not
consumer protection.

52

The exceptions are Mississippi and Texas.
David A. Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries: Is Consumer Protection Just What the
Doctor Ordered? 78 N.C. L. Rev. 5 (1999) (noting that majority of the states that enacted
prohibitions on drive-through deliveries excluded state employees and Medicaid
beneficiaries from the statute).
54
Washington S.B. 5857 (2016).
53
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I. Some Empirical Evidence
The legislative campaign against MACs turned on whether pharmacies
were being paid enough for dispensing generic drugs. As we summarize
below, the two sides staked out competing positions on various factual
matters.
Pharmacies insisted that PBMs were underpaying them, by setting MAC
levels too low, and failing to update them quickly enough when acquisition
costs increased. Pharmacies argued that the resulting shortfalls in payment
placed considerable financial pressure on independent pharmacies
(particularly those in rural areas) – causing closures and more limited access
to pharmacy services.
PBMs insisted that they were paying the correct amounts – and
pharmacies that were losing money on dispensed generic prescriptions were
either paying higher acquisition costs than they needed to; were mistaken
about the transactions in question; or did not realize that MACs were
intended to average out across all the generic prescriptions dispensed by a
well-run pharmacy, with over-payments on some drugs compensating for
under-payments on others.
What do we actually know about these issues (i.e., MAC usage and
levels, and access to pharmacy services)? We consider each in turn.
1. MAC Usage and Levels
In ongoing research, one of us (Hyman) interviewed personnel at four
PBMs about their use of MACs. All four PBMs used MACs for most drugs
that were available in generic form. MACs were typically set for each
generic drug in all of the available dosing strengths. MAC levels were set
based on pricing information from various sources, including Medicaid
MAC and FUL lists; and price lists from wholesalers and other sources
(e.g., NADAC and Medi-Span). All four PBMs used this pricing
information to create their own MAC lists – each using its own proprietary
methods. Each PBM maintained multiple MAC lists, which varied
depending on the contracts with plan sponsors. Some MAC lists were
regional, but most were applied on a national basis. All four PBMs insisted
that they took account of changes in drug acquisition costs in updating their
MAC lists – in some instances doing so on a daily basis.
Each PBM had its own appeals mechanism. Appeals were triggered
when a pharmacy submitted documentation confirming that the drug was
actually dispensed to a PBM customer, and that the MAC was below the
pharmacy’s actual acquisition cost. All of the PBMs used the information
derived from appeals as part of a feedback loop to inform the levels at
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which MACs were set. All four PBMs reported that appeals were a small
(i.e., << 1%) share of total transactions.
Of course, there are limitations to qualitative studies of this sort. None
of those being interviewed were under oath. MACs are a hot issue, and
those being interviewed were unlikely to volunteer information that would
make their PBM-employers look bad. Qualitative research can tell us how
PBMs create and maintain their MAC lists – but only quantitative research
can answer the question of how often PBMs pay pharmacies less (and
more) than their acquisition cost; how large those deviations actually are;
whether there are any time trends in these patterns; and whether the drugs in
question were available for less from a different wholesaler than the one
used by the pharmacy in question.
It is exceedingly difficult to conduct such research, since the
pharmaceutical marketplace is quite dynamic; data from multiple sources is
required; and all of the PBMs treat their MAC lists as proprietary and
confidential. Those difficulties notwithstanding, Washington’s 2016 MAC
legislation required the Washington Office of Insurance Commissioner to
conduct a quantitative study of these issues. The expected completion date
of the study, which is being conducted by HMA and Mercer, is November,
2016. But, regardless of the results of such studies, from an economic
perspective what matters is whether pharmacies are willing to participate in
the networks that PBMs have created, and whether those networks are
acceptable to payers.
2. Access to Pharmacy Services
Pharmacists obviously care a great deal about whether their pharmacy
closes its doors, and whether it is operated by a chain or is independent.
But, it is less obvious that anyone else should be all that invested in those
issues. We should care about whether patients have access to pharmacy
services – and not nearly as much (if at all) about the specifics of how those
services are delivered. And, we should know more about the relevant size
of the geographic market for pharmacy services before concluding any
given pharmacy closure is a problem.55
That said, there is evidence that there have been a material number of
closures of rural pharmacies.56 But, this trend long pre-dates the recent
55

For example, when Illinois was debating tort reform in 2003-2005, it was routinely
noted that there were no neurosurgeons south of Springfield. No one ever discussed
whether we actually should be concerned about the number of neurosurgeons south of
Springfield – particularly when Carbondale was closer to St. Louis (96 miles) than to
Springfield (160 miles).
56
See, e.g., Kelli Todd, Fred Ullrich & Keith Mueller, Rural Pharmacy Closures:
Implications for Rural Communities, RUPRI Brief No. 2012-5, at https://www.public-
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dispute over MAC levels – and the number of closures was much higher in
2007-2009, with subsequent trends “not as pronounced or as clear as in
earlier years.”57 More importantly, a recent study of access to pharmacy
services for Medicare Part D beneficiaries by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services found that 99% of urban beneficiaries had access to a
pharmacy within 2 miles; 99% of suburban beneficiaries had access to a
pharmacy within 5 miles; and 97% of rural beneficiaries had access to a
pharmacy within 15 miles.58 These findings suggest that pharmacy closures
have not had a material impact on access to pharmacy services.
V.

DISCUSSION

A. How Representative are MACs?
We have presented a single case study. Readers might well ask whether
we have cherry-picked a particularly egregious example of rent-seeking to
justify our conclusions. We do not believe that our findings are skewed by
the specific example we have chosen. In related work, we examine other
examples of health care regulation, including restrictions on entry (i.e.,
licensure and certificates of need/public necessity) and restrictions on the
terms for which goods and services may be provided (i.e., mandated
benefits, any willing provider legislation, and other planks in what used to
be known as the “patient bill of rights.”) Our MAC-related findings are
fully consistent with our findings in this larger research project.
Other scholars have reached similar conclusions about health care
legislation/regulation.59 And there is a rich public choice literature,
documenting that similar complaints may be lodged at legislation and
regulation across jurisdictions -- both over time and across substantive areas
of law and policy. Whatever else one might want to say in defense of MAC
statutes, they fit comfortably into a rich tradition, where “the favored
health.uiowa.edu/rupri/publications/policybriefs/2013/Pharmacist%20Loss%20Brief%2002
2813.pdf
57
See Fred Ullrich & Keith Mueller, Update: independently owned pharmacy closures
in
rural
America,
2003-2013,
RUPRI
Brief
No.
2014-7,
at
http://cph.uiowa.edu/rupri/publications/policybriefs/2014/Pharm%20Closure%20Brief%20
June%202014.pdf. See also Donald Klepser et al, Independently Owned Pharmacy
Closures
in
Rural
America,
RUPRI
Brief
No.
2008-2,
at
http://cph.uiowa.edu/rupri/publications/policybriefs/2008/b20082%20Independently%20Owned%20Pharmacy%20Closures.pdf
58
CMS, Analysis of Part D Beneficiary Access to Preferred Cost Sharing Pharmacies
(PCSPs) April 28, 2015, at https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-DrugCoverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/PCSP-Key-Results-Report-Finalv04302015.pdf
59
See e.g., Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in
American Health Care, 69 L. Contemp. Probs. 7 (2006).
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pastime of state and local governments” is the “dishing out [of] special
economic benefits to certain in-state industries.”60
B. Balance This!
The symposium at which this article was presented is framed around the
optimal balance between competition and consumer protection. That issue
is obviously difficult and complex – and no one has come up with a perfect
solution to the problem. That is why it provides a good subject for a
symposium. Balancing competition against provider protection that is
masquerading as consumer protection is another matter entirely. That
problem is easy.61 And, as show in our larger research project, most of
what passes as consumer protection in health care is, in fact, provider
protection. We should stop pretending otherwise.
C. Implications of Our Analysis for State Action
Our findings obviously call into question both the scope of the state
action doctrine and the deference that doctrine gives to the decisions of state
legislators. MAC statutes exemplify the degree to which private economic
actors are willing and able to enlist state authority to obstruct entry or
otherwise restrict competitive threats to incumbent market participants.62
And, as noted previously, these efforts make perfect sense.63 The relentless
expansion of the U.S. criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act’s ban on
cartelization has created powerful incentives for firms to seek comfort from
state legislators.64 Privately agree with your competitors to exclude rivals,
and you may go to jail; get the state to do it for you, and it is the
competitors who may face a prison sentence for failing to comply.
State action also has distributional consequences – including spill-over
anti-competitive effects in other states. The benefits of MAC legislation are
captured by in-state pharmacies, but the costs are largely externalized to
out-of-state PBMs – particularly during the term of lock-in contracts
between PBMs and payers.65 Previous commentators have noted the
60

Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004).
See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (“Perhaps the adage about
hard cases making bad law should be revised to cover easy cases.”) (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment).
62
The expansion of state licensure requirements is documented in Aaron Edlin &
Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Occupational Licensing and the Quality of
Service. 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1093 (2014); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and
Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUBLIC POL’Y 209 (2016).
63
See supra note 1, and accompanying text.
64
James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence with International
Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. L. REV.
1555, 1561-62 (2010).
65
PBMs contract with plan sponsors on either a “pass-through” or a “lock-in” basis. A
61
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importance of limiting state action immunity to laws that have little or no
spillovers into other states.66 Retrenchment of the state action doctrine, and
closer and more skeptical scrutiny of state-based restrictions on
competition, would reflect the reality that the limits imposed by one state
routinely damage the interests of citizens in other states – particularly when
electronic commerce has diminished the amount of commerce that is truly
“local.”
For those who are concerned with distributive (in)justice, health care
regulation exemplifies the various ways in which “the haves come out
ahead.”67 Of course, such reverse-Robin Hood schemes are not limited to
health care. Many of the state restrictions that have been challenged by the
DOJ and FTC, whether through litigation or competition advocacy, have
perverse (i.e., upside-down) distributional effects.68
Perhaps there is something to be learned from the ways in which other
countries handle these matters. Many countries closely scrutinize anticompetitive state measures, and intervene forcefully to strike them down.69
Other jurisdictions do allow political subdivisions to restrict competition,
but they subject such interventions to more demanding standards and more
frequently invalidate them.70 For example, the European Commission
places sharp limits on when a jurisdiction can provide “state aid,” including
an ex ante approval process that is back-stopped by the availability of
recoupment and restitution.71 These approaches more fully address the
destructive potential of state curbs on competition than the “nothing to see
here, move along” approach taken by the U.S. in its implementation of the
state action doctrine.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Our proposal is modest. We should begin by acknowledging two
simple facts: (i) virtually everything that is billed as “consumer protection”
lock-in contract obligates the PBM to hit the contractually specified targets throughout the
contractual term, irrespective of changes in the pharmaceutical market – including changes
in the amounts that must be paid to dispensing pharmacies because of the effect of state
MAC statutes.
66
See, e.g., Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust
State Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in
Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 12-17-18 (1997).
67
See supra note 16, and accompanying text.
68
Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 64, at 1565.
69
Eleanor M. Fox & Deborah Healey, When the State Harms Competition – The Role
for Competition Law, 79 Antitrust L.J. 769 (2014).
70
Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 64, at 1584-85.
71
See
European
Commission,
State
Aid
Control,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html
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in the health care space is actually “provider protection;” and (ii) the state
action doctrine insulates such conduct, as well as other forms of rentseeking from antitrust scrutiny – at least as long as the state can satisfy the
minimal hurdles created by the clear articulation and active supervision
requirements.
The antitrust laws work reasonably well in dealing with private anticompetitive conduct, but the state action doctrine turns the antitrust laws
into a goalie that only guards half the net.72 That approach isn’t working,
and can’t be made to work. To continue our metaphor, players quickly
learn to shoot at the unguarded half of the net.73 We should treat provider
protection as a form of state aid, and use the competition laws to strike
down a substantially greater share of the rent-seeking statutes that emerge
from the legislative process. Of course, the toolkit for fixing these
problems is not limited to competition law. The list of “fixes” should also
include greater public scrutiny; routine-sun-setting; and a healthy dose of
skepticism about the operations of the administrative state.74
What about the problem of striking the proper balance between true
consumer protections and competition? And, the obligations imposed by
federalism? Get back to us once the system has been purged of provider
protection. Until then, we all have bigger fish to catch, kill, and fry.

72

We leave it up to the reader to decide whether the hypothetical goalie is playing
hockey, lacrosse, soccer, or water polo.
73
See Muris, supra note 1 (stating, as a competition policy theorem, the idea that “as a
competition system achieves success in attacking private restraints, it increases the efforts
that firms will devote to obtaining public restraints.”)
74
See Hyman & Svorny, supra note 7.
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Appendix: States With MAC Statutes
Arkansas: Ark Code Ann § 17-92-507 (2013); S.B. 688 (2015);
California: A.B. 627 (2015) Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-37-103.5 2014; Delaware: HB 284 (2016); Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 465.1862
(2015); Georgia: H.B. 470 (2015); Hawaii: H.B. 252 (2015); Iowa: Iowa
Code § 510B.8 (2014); Kansas: SB 103 (2016); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. State.
Ann. § 304.17A.162 (2013) and SB 117 (2016); Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 22:1863, 22:1864, 22:1865 (2014); Maine: LD 1150 (2016);
Maryland: Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 15-1628.1 (2014); Minnesota: Minn. Stat.
§ 151.71 (2014); Missouri: SB 865 (2016); Mississippi: HB 456 (2016);
Montana: S.B. 211 (2015); New Hampshire: HB 1664 (2016); New Jersey:
S.B. 2301 (2015); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59A-61-4 (2014); New
York: S.B. 3346-2015; North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-56A-5 (2014);
North Dakota: N.D. Century Code § 19-02.1-14.2-2013; Ohio: Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 3959.111 (2015); Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 59, §§ 357
and 360 (2015), and SB 1150 (2016); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat.§ 735.534
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